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HERACLITUS’ DISCURSIVE AUTHORITY 
L Jordan (University of Cape Town) 
Heraclitus, who lived and flourished in Ephesus sometime in the late sixth century, 
stands quite alone amidst the Presocratics. His thought is expressed in fragments that 
represent early and beautiful prose artistry, their aphoristic quality matched very rarely. 
That, combined with a willingness to flout logical doctrine and a seeming ability to adapt 
to many schools whilst never being fully absorbed by them, has made him a solitary yet 
immense figure in philosophy. Ultimately, he provided the model for Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra. 
His enigmatic thought has led to many interpretations, which in turn have led to their 
own important developments in Western philosophy.1 On the other hand, his often 
radical statements have with equal frequency led to his simple dismissal as an eccentric. 
That dismissal is frequently involved in questions of philosophy’s discursive features, a 
question that is controversial even to frame.2 Hence much could be gained from an 
examination of the discursive features of Heraclitus, and in particular one deceptively 
simple question: why did his contemporaries take him seriously? To answer this, we 
must first examine what else they took seriously. 
1. Authoritative discourse in oral/literate Greece 
Ionia in the late sixth and early fifth centuries was a culture in transition from predominantly 
oral to literate forms of discourse. This oral culture looked to the oral body of Homeric verse 
for its authoritative social discourse, indeed this verse was the prime means of enculturation, 
or the implanting of socially acceptable behaviour.3 In addition, the performance and space of 
social actions were saturated by epic verse. A key institution for the creation and 
dissemination of culture, the symposium, was directly linked to the Heroic poems by the 
inscription of epic verse on pottery, hence re-enforcing the importance of oral paideia for 
social order.4 This practice continued in the fifth and sixth centuries, albeit in a diminished 
form, with the emphasis laid on identification with heroic personages, and the expression of a 
way of life.5 Similarly, in the ritual sphere, dedicatory objects were inscribed with composite 
hexameters. Three features of this practice are of great importance: the inscriptions were a 
form of non-perishing, continuous communication with the god in his own home, the 
inscriptions were for the god to read, not humans, and the inscribed dedication was connected 
with the whole ritual oral performance, a performance of primary importance in public 
discourse.6 
 In the public employment of religion, rooted in the various oracles, we find a more 
complex intersection between authoritative oral utterance and developing methods of 
                                                 
1. Kahn (1979:3-6) gives a very useful survey of the later influence of Heraclitus on antiquity. Amongst 
moderns the great names are of course Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
2. See Most’s (1999b:332-333) discussion, especially Aristotle’s formative influence. 
3. Robb (1994:174). 
4. Robb (1994:52). 
5. Robb (1994:63). 
6. Robb (1994:56, 59, 61). The last feature is an interesting indication of the continuous transition between 




inscription. First of all, it is necessary for us to distinguish between the oracle as day to day, 
historical reality, and as legendary predictor.7 The historical oracle had no marked preference 
for discursive form, dispensing sanction orally that could be written down, with no clear 
preference for such inscription.8 On the other hand, the legendary oracles were clearly 
stamped as oral performances, which were spoken to questioners, and yet their transmission 
and position as authority was dependent on the tradition that invented and made use of them. 
Hence they were discursively bound to precisely the forms highlighted above as that tradition 
moved from orality to literacy. Within that tradition, though, certain features stamp them, so 
that they form a sub-discourse. However, the historical utterances in a sense derive their 
authority from the prestige of legend, and are rather ordinary, so that we shall cease to 
consider them. 
By the period of Heraclitus’ activity legal procedure was similarly involved in a transition 
from oral to literate authority. A legal dispute would be arbitrated in two distinct phases. In 
the first, a case was decided in strict, automatic accordance with a written code, but only on 
the basis of the oral testimony of procedural witnesses,9 who served to verify the performance 
of a specific event, i.e. as the oral equivalent of written records. These witnesses served to 
legalize social actions, especially regarding the distribution of property, and, indeed, were the 
only admissable form of record, so that their veracity was unquestionable.10 Hence early 
literate law was fully dependant on oral witnesses, and if these witnesses did not perform 
their duty societal breakdown would ensue. In this period of Greek life we have a picture of 
judicial authority resulting from the combination of inscribed law and oral performance.  
The forms of authority in paideia, religion and justice contemporary with Heraclitus are 
then based on an intersection of inscribed text and oral performance. Turning to the discourse 
of this authority we find that it is imbued with by the major epic poets, Homer and Hesiod. 
The inscriptions on objects involved in social performance are all taken from the body of epic 
verse, which served to constrain societal behaviour.11 More importantly, the features of this 
verse served to constrain, perhaps constitute, succesful public discourse through the seventh 
to fourth centuries.12 These crucial features were a claim to truthfulness,13 to a content of 
utmost importance, by a range of signification outside the discourse’s formal limits, a 
requirement of narrative, and a greater concern for formally small elements than larger 
ones.14 In addition, for a discourse to reach its audience it was necessary for that discourse to 
adopt many of the linguistic features of Homer and Hesiod.15 
Legendary oracular utterance requires two central features. First, it is necessary for the 
prediction to be of utmost importance, especially for a heroic character, in order for it to be 
                                                 
7. As Fontenrose (1978:34) shows, the historical oracle chiefly pronounced prosaic sanctions, completely 
different from those of legend and legendary history, especially Herodotus. 
8. Parke and Wormell (1956:33). 
9. Robb (1991:648). 
10. If two witnesses contradicted each other the trial went to a further stage where the judge adjucated between 
competing claims. However prevalent false witnessing, for the sake of judicial performance all witnesses 
had to be admitted as valid (Robb 1991:649-650). 
11.  Robb (1994:53). 
12.  Most (1999b:334). 
13.  I am not aware of any thorough study on the nature of epic “truth”. This truth is guaranteed by divine 
sanction, but can we say that they are identical? 
14. Admirably developed by Most (1999b:343-350), who points out early Greek philosophy’s later confor-
mance to these features. Naturally, Heraclitus’ specific conformance is discussed below. 
15. Eloquently argued by Most (1999b:336). 
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handed down as traditional.16 Second, they have two distinct sets of features, each 
corresponding to a particular temporal view. In hindsight, they are clear yet ambiguous, their 
initial meaning revealed from later events.17 Further, seen from this angle their meaning is 
dependant on a narrative which later validates their prediction. On the other hand, they are 
frequently embedded in narrative frameworks which require the imaginative act of hearing 
them for the first time (ad tempo), at which point the ambiguity need not be declared, and, 
importantly, narrative is not of crucial importance, and the utterances stand on their own as 
divine truth. Such discursive shifting is quite remarkable, and allows a wide range of 
identification.  
As for witnessing, the crucial features are the necessity of physical proximity to an action 
in order to authoritatively describe it, and the formal requirement of oath-taking at both 
stages of the act, that is before both recording it and manifesting it by oral performance in 
court.18 In addition, epic discourse again intrudes into other forms of authority, since it was 
commonplace for epical formulas to be quoted in disputation.19  
Finally, we move to the linguistic features of this oral discourse. For both epic and 
religious utterance we first note the crucial use of ambiguity. In oral societies polysemic word 
use and word play is always common,20 but in archaic and classical Greece it was especially 
prevalent. It was prominent in Homer,21 though, interestingly, Hesiod used it infrequently, 
and seemed wary of it.22 On the other hand, it was prevalent in legendary oracular utterance 
which foretold future events. Such ambiguity not only masked intent (and provided pleasing 
storytelling devices),23 but served as the only fit vehicle for divine utterance. As defenders of 
the oracle pointed out, divine speech could not be rendered simply and intelligibly in human 
terms.24 Polysemic word-play is hence rooted in the divine, where it served to convey 
multiple meanings within a single utterance. The device seems necessary in the absence of 
written texts within which to elaborate difficult concepts. In societal performances, though, in 
which utterances relate to human experience, precisely a specificity of meaning is required. 
Ambiguity in a procedural witness obviously would be judicially calamitous, and in plainly 
didactic verse the need for precise instructions is equally clear.25 Similarly, ambiguity is 
entirely absent from the historical oracles of Delphi, which are predominantly plainly 
expressed sanctions of courses of action.26 We can tentatively posit that precisely ambiguity 
in language served to identify authoritative discourse with the divine and the heroic, and with 
the expectations of divinity and oracular utterance, and, indeed, as an indication such 
discourse was inspired. 
                                                 
16. Fontenrose (1978:32), who shows that most legendary responses were “dramatic” commands of a personal 
nature, often connected with life and death. Importantly, they were given to heroes, and preserved in the 
tradition of colonization. 
17. See Kahn (1979:91), to which we should add that it is precisely this resolution of meaning that tells us the 
statement was polyvalent in the first place. 
18. Robb (1991:643). 
19. Robb (1994:78). 
20. Robb (1994:47). 
21. Stanford (1972:114). 
22. Stanford (1972:116). 
23. Fontenrose (1978:234). 
24. Stanford (1972:121). 
25. Hence Hesiod’s warning against ambiguity (Stanford 1972:160). 




Finally, we can elicit two very subtle features of oral discourse. On a constitutive level, 
oral discourse presupposes that its participants share a common language. Without the infinite 
repetition of inscribed text, and hence the possibility of being deciphered, an oral act is 
meaningless if it is not immediately understood.27 Hence authority in oral discourse requires 
participants who have a common referential code. On a formal level we should note that for 
its effectiveness oral discourse requires a heightened efficiency of language. Without a text 
which by repeated reading may clarify or enrich each statement, to be effective an oral 
performance must display itself all at once. This does not require every feature to be instantly 
accessible, but precisely that the presence of each feature must announce itself.28 Ambiguity 
is a direct consequence of this principle; in Greece it results in concentrated expression, as 
found in the Homeric similes and formulas, and the elaborate ritual practice surrounding 
oracular utterance. Similarly, didactic poetry, or formal witnessing, would be clearly 
unambiguous, and reinforced by the swearing of divine oath.29 
2. Heraclitus’ discourse 
Turning to Heraclitus’ discourse we must first pay attention to its structual form, i.e. the 
means and conditions of its performance and transmission. Here we must tread carefully, 
relying on the doxographic material and our understanding of the prevailing cultural 
institutions. My method will be to accept as valid any part of the tradition unassailed by 
reasonable doubt.  
First, it is almost certain that Heraclitus himself wrote a book of some sort.30 On the other 
hand, it is equally clear that during his lifetime the contents of that book would have been 
almost solely accessible through oral performance,31 and this content was of the aphoristic 
form we possess today. Hence we have an inscribed text whose small, self-contained units are 
capable of effective oral performance, but written in prose (if rhythmic) and not forming a 
coherent narrative. These latter features bring the work closer in its structural aspects to the 
law code and the ad tempo oracle than the epic poet.32 As a performance, then, it does not 
derive its authority from a paideutic function reliant on the narrative exemplum, but rather on 
                                                 
27. Though as a caveat we should note that an oral act will clearly produce some effect on the speaker even if it 
is comprehended but misunderstood. 
28. In other words, we cannot elicit linguistic features from oracular texts by repeated readings. Frost’s 
repetition of the line “and miles to go before I sleep”, at the end of Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening, 
restores this quality of obvious metaphor to a literate text. 
29. Two interesting and important questions are raised from this discussion. First, what is the role of lyric 
poetry, and what are its authoritative features? Second, how does writing affect ambiguity? Answers to 
these questions, especially the latter, are suggested in this paper, but a more thorough study would be 
immensely valuable. 
30. Tejera (1991:155) objects that it is only referred to as a σύγγραµµα, which does not necessarily imply a 
“book”, and that at his time Heraclitus’ would have been unlikely to write one. However, only 50 years 
later Thucydides calls his book a σύγγραµµα, and already at the time the Ionian prose authors were writing 
books referred to as their λόγος. 
31. Even if Heraclitus were placed later than the Apollodoran dating of 480 BC, which is most unlikely (Kirk, 
Raven and Schofield 1983:182), the discursive forms of his society would remain primarily oral. Indeed, 
they only begin to change in Athens in the late fifth century BC (Robb 1994:especially ch. 58). 
32. A feature starkly revealed by even a superficial comparison to Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, 
all of whom composed in verse, heavily invoking epic themes (Most 1999b:351-353). 
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the commanding order of the law code and the ad tempo oracular utterance, which we 
remember is sanctioned by divine infallibility.33 
An important subquestion involves the societal context of the book’s performance. It 
might seem strange to speak of Heraclitus’ societal performance given his traditional 
isolation, but the rapid dissemination of his influence,34 and the exclusively performative 
means of dissemination, show that his writings must have been socially performed.  
Moving from the overall performative aspect of Heraclitus’ discourse to the more specific 
linguistic form we discover an astonishingly varied use of the differing authoritative 
discourses sketched above. Fragment DK 22 B1, which I give in full below, even if it were 
not the first part of the book,35 is by far the longest continuous text we possess, and is 
stylistically highly representative of the rest of the fragments. Hence I shall attempt to elicit 
precisely those stylistic features from this fragment, hoping thereby to demonstrate the use 
Heraclitus makes of his surrounding authoritative discourse. 
τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ 
ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινοµένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, 
πειρώµενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων (5) τοιουτέων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦµαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων 
ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες 
ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. 
This word existing forever men do not comprehend both before they hear it and having heard 
before; for all things occurring in accordance with this word, they seem as the inexperienced, 
experiencing words and deeds such as I reveal, distinguishing each and saying how they are; 
but other men are eluded by what they do being awake just as what they do being asleep 
escapes them. (DK 22 B1) 
The first sentence of this fragment makes a series of claims both explicit and implicit. First, I 
take the adverb αἰεί as a praegnans constructio modifying both of the first two clauses.36 The 
opening clause, τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεί (“this word existing forever”) makes a number 
of bold claims resting on the various associations of λόγος. As Kahn (1979:97) notes, it 
evokes the standard opening of empirical prose works, notably that of Hecataeus, who indeed 
talks of logoi. In addition, in stating that this λόγος is, indeed that it always is, the fragment 
asserts both itself and its content in the terms of epic epistemology, as a primarily existent 
                                                 
33. If we accept the story that Heraclitus dedicated his book in the temple then we can posit immediately that 
he is invoking both epic and divine authority, since then his book becomes an offering which speaks to the 
god. However, the conclusions one could draw from the anecdote are out of all scale to its veridity, so I will 
not consider it in the main discussion. 
34. Diogenes Laetius IX, 5. The rapidity and extent of his dissemination is evinced by the presence of a 
Heraclitean, Cratylus, in late fifth century BC Athens (Kahn 1979:3). 
35. Tejera (1991:493-494) points to the lack of consensus on the issue, but as Kahn (1979:7, 967) points out, 
the fragment is quite unique for length and syntactic complexity. We should note that the fragment is 
exclusively methodical, simply outlining the problems of performance, without any explicit philosophic 
content. Finally, no one has yet provided a good reason to doubt the veracity of Aristotle when he says the 
fragment came at the beginning of the writing. 
36. In performance the first two clauses form a perfect isocola if αἰεί is spoken as part of the first clause, so that 
at least in speaking it more naturally applies to the first rather than the second clause. After Kahn (1979:93), 
most scholars have taken αfiεί as part of the first fragment (e.g. Curd 1991; Robinson 1991), yet I see no 
reason for excluding both except for a bizarre requirement for a clarity obviously not present in the 




object. It also conforms to the expectation of comprehensiveness by declaring that it holds 
forever, a claim also resonant of the “infinite” and “unperishing” substances of the Milesians.  
On the other hand, as it claims these discursive forms it modifies them by expressly 
omitting any claims to authorship. The λόγος simply is, it has not been written (as 
Hecataeus), nor has it been inspired (as epic). Indeed, the first eight clauses of the fragment 
are exclusively concerned with the interaction of the λόγος and the audience, those who hear 
or attempt it. Indeed, when the author is finally introduced, he is related to the hearers and the 
logos not directly, but through the compound vague relatives τοιουτέων ὁκοίων, leaving a 
deliberate seperation between “what sort of things” are investigated, and the logos with its 
hearers. The concern with impersonality here is remarkable, and requires some explanation. I 
suggest, tentatively, that this erasure of the author, in an oral context, implicitly gives the text 
the status of a law code, in which laws (short, non-narrative texts) are inscribed as a nameless 
authority, common to all, to be experienced in a court. A number of clues in the text point in 
this direction. First, such an identification helps make sense of the phrase ἀξύνετοι . . . 
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι, which presents the difficulty of requiring understanding before 
performance,37 if we remember the judicial principle that ignorance does not excuse 
violation, i.e. that one must understand the law before formally hearing it in a “trial”. In 
addition, the phrase κατὰ τὸν λόγον is highly reminiscent of the idiomatic κατὰ τὸν νόµον. 
We may also note the suggestive emphasis on the oral act and the necessity of experience, 
both aspects intrinsic to oral legal authority.  
As interpretatively rich as this suggestion is, we cannot consider it either exclusive or solid 
enough to serve as a base for an extensive examination of the fragments. In particular, the 
opening fragment is also tied to esotericism and the ambiguity of oracular utterance. A 
certain tension in meaning and syntax mark the entire fragment, beginning with the 
syntactical position of αἰεί. First, the fragment states that men “become inexperienced”, and 
ἀξύνετοι can be taken variously as “uncommon”, “non-understanding”, or “not grasping”, or, 
in Homeric terms, as a very physical non-perception.38 Words are repeated in differing forms 
and different positions, such as the chiasma in the first sentence on πρόσθεν / ἀκούσαντες — 
ἀκοῦσαι / πρῶτον, or the play on λανθάνει / ἐπιλανθάνονται at the end of the fragment. The 
rhythm of the prose frequently approximates verse in balance and regularity, and sound 
devices link opposites together. Such prose is highly reminiscent of the stylized, deliberately 
ambiguous verse of the legendary oracle, although the wide discursive ambiguity preclude 
any firm conclusions but an attempt towards an esoterism reminiscent of the way oracles 
function in legend.39 
If we consider the content of Heraclitus’ fragments we find the same pattern of discursive 
incorporation and modulation. First, we must note the use of epic figures, beginning with καὶ 
ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων, a distinction with epic overtones.40 However, in the oral performance of an 
inscribed text words and works are completely coextensive, as in performance work becomes 
                                                 
37. Kahn (1979:98). 
38. Lesher (1983:165). The word is a key term in the Homeric idea of perception, clearly corresponding to 
what Mourelatos (1973) calls the naive metaphysics of things. Its use here in the negative and so close to 
“hearing” implicitly shifts away from just such a metaphysical view. 
39. A veiled identification made rather more explicit in DK 22 B93, on the Lord of Delphi who “indicates”, 
commonly taken as a selfreference to Heraclitus’ own difficulty. Fontenrose’s (1978:238) suggestion that 
the fragment merely indicates that the Pythia is the sign for Apollo’s speech is absurdly banal. 
40.  Kahn (1979:99). 
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word, not, as in epic, referring to spheres of action and counsel.41 Further, we find in a few 
other fragments direct reference to previously authoritative figures themselves, though not in 
the exclusively derisive terms generally assumed. Several fragments are clearly agonistic, 
none more so than DK 22 B42 and A23, both again given below, in which Heraclitus states 
that Homer and Archilochus should be expelled from the contests, and that poets are 
untrustworthy. 
τόν τε Ὅµηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον 
ὁµοίως.  
Homer deserves to be thrown out of the competition and beaten with a staff,42 and the same 
goes for Archilochus. (B42)  
. . . ποιηταῖς καὶ µυθογράφοις χρῆσθαι µάρτυσι περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουµένων, ὅπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡµῶν περὶ 
τῶν πλείστων, ἀπίστους ἀµφισβητουµένων παρεχόµενοι βεβαιωτὰς κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον. 
 . . . Using the poets and mythmakers as witnesses about the unknown, . . ., they are bringing in 
untrustworthy authorities for the dispute, according to Heraclitus. (A23) 
Both, however, simultaneously affirm the previous position of the poets,43 and elicit the 
question: who is to replace them?44 Similarly, Hesiod, who is διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων (DK 
22 B57), is untenable as he does not know day or night. Those who have πολυµαθίη will also 
not do, since they have not been taught understanding.45 We should not be quick to assume 
that authority is being claimed for investigation, for precisely Pythagoras, despite having 
investigated greatly, is impugned for bad technē, choosing what he wanted, and making his 
own wisdom (DK 22 B129).46 It is also curious that nowhere in the fragments are the 
philosophers of the Milesian school mentioned, so that without preconception it seems 
Heraclitus does not consider himself as competing with them.47 On the other hand, a number 
of the features pointed out in this paper indicate some continuity with the Ionian prose 
                                                 
41.  This unity of word and deed in performance was perhaps noticed and so commented on by Heraclitus as an 
implicit and highly interesting example of the unity of opposites. 
42.  There is a pun in the Greek here that I have not yet seen adequately translated, and is certainly beyond me. 
The pun is on ῥαπίζεσθαι, to be beaten with a staff, with ῥαψῳδεῖν, to recite of epic. 
43.  Also confirmed by the statement that Homer was τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων, which is undoubtedly 
ironic, but on first hearing, to a contemporary, would have been merely an affirmation of an already held 
position. Homer is not merely derided (Most 1999b:338), but instead the fragment points out that men can 
be deceived because of a lack of sight, i.e. the causes of deception are frequently hidden from us (on which 
see Lesher 1983:158). 
44.  Analogous, but perhaps more extensive, to Xenophanes’ use of the poetic form and attack on the epic poets 
so as to compete himself in rhapsodic competition (Most 1999b:352). 
45.  Lesher (1983:1578) points out that here noon and its acquisition are analogous to linguistic comprehension, 
though how one is taught language, and what Heraclitus thought of linguistic acquisition is an unpursued 
question. 
46.  κακοτεχνέω can mean both to use bad, i.e. morally reprehensible art, and to employ faulty technique (LSJ). 
Since Pythagoras is impugned for “choosing what he wanted”, κακοτεχνέω carries both meanings, i.e. 
Pythagoras’ fault lies in creating a faulty system after his inquiries, and hence is “worthless”. Such a line of 
reasoning prefigures Ralph Ellison’s statement that bad craft is a moral wrong. 
47.  The reference to Thales in DK 22B 105 is uninformative, seeming a mere restatement of the tradition 




tradition, so that we cannot altogether rule out a connection, but we can posit that if it exists 
such a connection is not of great significance.48  
None of these fragments tells us to which authority we should turn having rejected earlier 
fragments.49 Indeed, no such explicit statement is given in any fragment, and certain hints 
contradict each other, resulting in the tangled modern attempts to extract a systematic 
epistemology from Heraclitus.50 Perhaps the largest obstacle in this problem is our greatest 
clue, since Heraclitus exonerates even himself from authority, positing instead that one should 
listen to the logos. Explosive as it seems, the fragment is in fact superfluous, for the 
placement of the text itself as the authoritative discourse is implicit everywhere. As 
discursive space is cleared precisely the discourse that clears it fills that space, providing that 
this discourse bears the structural and formal characteristics of pre-existing authority. On the 
other hand, if we examine the internal qualities of Heraclitus’ λόγος, and allow ourselves 
some speculation, we note that contemporary consensus holds it as referring both to 
Heraclitus’ discourse and the object of that discourse.51 Hence, by performing the steps of 
distancing himself from his discourse, and so making it self-sufficient, and simultaneously of 
rendering that discourse authoritative, Heraclitus in fact makes of the logos a criterion of 
objective truth and authoritative utterance. For supremely eloquent evidence of his success in 
this project we need turn no further than the first words of the Gospel of John.52 
3. Conclusion 
The overriding impression gathered from this investigation is that the history of philosophy 
remains far more complicated than commonly assumed. We may not interpret successive 
figures’ thought without considering the form in which that thought was uttered,53 and the 
consequent interaction of thought and form. Since Plato scholars have assumed philosophic 
form to be timeless, a constant result of philosophy’s eternal truths. Though such an 
assumption has today largely fallen away, there has been little revision of attitudes towards 
the pre-Platonists.54 This paper has aimed at such a revision in the treatment of Heraclitus, 
demonstrating that in order to gain a necessary cultural authority he had to adopt forms quite 
different from modern philosophic discourse, yet powerful enough to remain relevant even 
                                                 
48.  Kahn (1979:99) argues an explicit connection based on φύσις, κόσµος and ἱστορίη. However, the first and 
second are not exclusively related to Ionian physics, and the use of the third is by Heraclitus himself given a 
much wider application (viz. his use of it in describing Pythagoras). Kahn’s own arguments against the 
“natural philosopher” interpretations of Heraclitus contradict his position here. 
49.  Even in an oral performance, to accept the rejection of an earlier authority is to accept one utterance, not to 
accept all of them. 
50.  Amongst others, see the entirely arbitrary attempt of Hussey (1982), the projection of Plato onto Heraclitus 
in Robinson (1991), and Robb’s (1991) attempt to deny any hint of an epistemology on the basis of a very 
selective reading. 
51.  For example, Kahn (1979), Curd (1991) and Robinson (1991). 
52.  Of course, to reach the Christians λόγος had to pass through the influence of Plato and the Stoics, but it is 
precisely this ability to remain vital despite such competing claims that demonstrates the resilience of the 
logos-concept, even until today when Mourelatos (1973) speaks of a logos-structured world. 
53.  Tejera (1991:494). 
54.  Plato is extensively treated by postmodernism, especially Derrida (Waugh 1991:610). I believe that one of 
Plato’s other great deceptions was to convince posterity that his discourse was radically divergent, and that 
we must investigate how philosophic form travelled from Homer to Plato if we are to understand the 
discursive crisis in which philosophy finds itself today. 
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today. Along the way we have found a Heraclitus even more subtle than we had thought, 
especially in his attitude towards religion and what one might call the “establishment”.  
If towards the end of the paper my arguments become more circumstantial, yet even then 
they retain a perspective lacking in those who cling to an image of philosophy as a radical 
break with religion. What is clear is that a voice which does not incorporate the discursive 
features of prevailing authority will quickly be forgotten. Were Heraclitus the conceited 
figure often presented by current scholarship one highly doubts his book would ever have 
been performed. This is not to label him popular, far from it, but simply to point out that his 
discourse, far from an attack on prevailing authority, was in some sense an attempt to join it.  
Finally, what only Aristotle doubts, the remains of Heraclitus’ writings contain much that 
is radical, contentious, and profound. Perhaps his most lasting contribution, the grasp of the 
structural unity of opposites,55 was through the texture of his language used to supersede the 
ritual religion of Greek society.56 Precisely this achievement, to weld philosophy to a form 
inclusive enough still to be relevant,57 places him on one of the peaks of philosophy. 
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